The counsel of the plaintiff suggests that the question presented by the certificate of the judges of the Circuit Court is divisible into two parts: 1st. Whether the record of the judgment recovered in Michigan was admissible under the pleadings; and, 2d. Whether, if admissible, the judgment constituted a bar to the present action. We think, however, that the admissibility of the record depends upon the operation of the judgment.
If the note in suit was merged in the judgment, then the judgment is a bar to the action, and an exemplification of its record is admissible, for it has long been settled that under the plea of the general issue in assumpsit evidence may be received to show, not merely that the alleged cause of action never existed, but also to show that it did not subsist at the commencement of the suit. On the other hand, if the note is not thus merged, it still forms a subsisting cause of action, and the judgment is immaterial and irrelevant.
The question then for determination relates to the operation of the judgment upon the note in suit.
The plaintiff contends that a copartnership note is the several obligation of each copartner, as well as the joint obligation of all, and that a judgment recovered upon the note against one copartner is not a bar to a suit upon the same note against another copartner; and the latter position is insisted upon as the rule of the common law, independent of the joint debtor act of Michigan.
It is true that each copartner is bound for the entire amount due on copartnership contracts; and that this obligation is so far several that if he is sued alone, and does not plead the non-joinder of his copartners, a recovery may be had against him for the whole amount due upon the contract, and a joint judgment against the copartners may be enforced against the property of each. But this is a different thing from the liability which arises from a joint and several contract. There the contract contains distinct engagements, that of each contractor individually, and that of all jointly, and different remedies may be pursued upon each. The contractors may be sued separately on their several engagements or together on their joint undertaking. But in copartnerships there is no such several liability of the copartners. The copartnerships are formed for joint purposes. The members undertake joint enterprises, they assume joint risks, and they incur in all cases joint liabilities. In all copartnership transactions this common risk and liability exist. Therefore it is that in suits upon these transactions all the copartners must be brought in, except when there is some ground of personal release from liability, as infancy or a discharge in bankruptcy; and if not brought in, the omission may be pleaded in abatement. The plea in abatement avers that the alleged promises, upon which the action is brought, were made jointly with another and not with the defendant alone, a plea which would be without meaning, if the copartnership contract was the several contract of each copartner.
The language of Lord Mansfield in giving the judgment of the King's Bench in Rice v. Shute, 'that all contracts with partners are joint and several, and every partner is liable to pay the whole,' must be read in connection with the facts o the case, and when thus read does not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to hold a copartnership contract the several contract of each copartner, as well as the joint contract of all the copartners, in the sense in which these terms are understood by the plaintiff's counsel, but only that the obligation of each copartner was so far several, that in a suit against him judgment would pass for the whole demand, if the non-joinder of his copartners was not pleaded in abatement.
The plea itself, which, as the court decided, must be interposed in such cases, is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a several liability.
For the support of the second position, that a judgment against one copartner on a copartnership note does not constitute a bar to a suit upon the same note against another copartner, the plaintiff relies upon the case of Sheehy v. Mandeville & Jamesson, decided by this court, and reported in 6 Cranch, 254. In that case the plaintiff brought a suit upon a promissory note given by Jamesson for a copartnership debt of himself and Mandeville. A previous suit had been brought upon the same note against Jamesson alone, and judgment recovered. To the second suit against the two copartners the judgment in the first action was pleaded by the defendant, Mandeville, and the court held that it constituted no bar to the second action, and sustained a demurrer to the plea.