Act of January 7, 1904, page 19.--Omitted as obsolete.
I have particularly noted in this memorandum the points in which the bill intentionally abrogates existing law and the more significant respects in which it modifies or amplifies it. The respects in which it intentionally abrogates existing law are very few, as shown in Part B of the memorandum. The phraseology of existing law is only here and there recognizable in the bill. That is because the bill attempts to be systematic and organic, and, second, because it has sought general terms, wherever descriptive, rather than particular specifications. Especially has it preferred this where the specifications might be limiting. This, as I have noted in the memorandum submitted to you, is particularly illustrated by the treatment of the "subject-matter." The bill contains only the general statement that the subject-matter is to include "all the works of an author," leaving the term "author" to be as broad as the Constitution intended; and, as you know, the courts have followed Congress in construing it to include the originator in the broadest sense, just as they have held "writings," as used in the Constitution, to include not merely literary but artistic productions.
After this general statement certain specifications follow in the bill of particular classes under which a particular application is to be made in the office, but these specifications are coupled with the proviso that they shall not be held to limit the subject-matter. The specifications so far as possible also substitute general terms for particulars. They omit, for instance, the terms "engravings, cuts, lithographs, painting, chromo, statues and statuary." They assume, however, that all of these articles will be included under the more general terms, as "prints and pictorial illustrations" or "reproductions of a work of art" or "works of art" or "models or designs for works of art." The term "works of art" is deliberately intended as a broader specification than "works of the fine arts" in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter (for instance, of applied design, not yet within the province of design patents), which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law.