(M292) I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit--by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.
(M293) The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.
(M294) I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.
(M295) In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.
(M296) There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.
(M297) Three sorts of useful knowledge--that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality(192).
(M298) Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.
(M299) We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes--physical & spiritual.
(M300) The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes--but then we must mean causes yt do nothing.
(M301) According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.
(M302) I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.