I am not preparing to characterise Gutchkov, whose sincere patriotism I do not doubt. I am speaking only of the system. It is difficult to decide who could have borne the heavy weight of administering the Army during the first period of the Revolution; but, in any case, Gutchkov's Ministry had not the slightest grounds to seek the part of guiding the life of the Army. It did not lead the Army. On the contrary, submitting to a "parallel power" and impelled from below, the Ministry, somewhat restively, _followed the Army_, until it came right up to the line, beyond which final ruin begins.
"To restrain the Army from breaking up completely under the influence of that pressure which proceeded from the Socialists, and in particular from their citadel--the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates--to gain time, to allow the diseased process to be absorbed, to help the healthy elements to gain strength, such was my aim," wrote Gutchkov to Kornilov in June, 1917. The whole question is whether the resistance to the destroying powers was resolute enough. The Army did not feel this. The officers read the orders, signed by Gutchkov, which broke up completely the foundations of military life and custom. That these orders were the result of a painful internal drama, a painful struggle and defeat--this the officers did not know, nor did it interest them. Their lack of information was so great that many of them even now, four years later, ascribe to Gutchkov the authorship of the celebrated "Order No. 1." However it may be, the officers felt themselves deceived and deserted. Their difficult position they ascribed principally to the reforms of the Minister of War, against whom a hostile feeling arose, heated still more by the grumbling of hundreds of Generals removed by him and of the ultra-monarchical section of the officers, who could not forgive Gutchkov his supposed share in the preparation of the Palace _coup d'état_ and of the journey to Pskov.[48]
Thus the resignation of this Minister, even if caused "by those conditions, in which the Government power was placed in the country, and in particular the power of the Minister of the Army and the Navy with respect to the Army and the fleet,"[49] had another justification as well--the want of support among the officers and the soldiery.