Footnote 1: [The experience of nearly thirty years has proved that these gloomy forebodings were unfounded. The Government and the condition of the Indian Empire have undergone enormous changes in that interval of time, but upon the whole the suppression of the military revolt of 1857 has placed British authority in India upon a more secure basis, the loyalty of the native princes to the Crown has increased, the native population is more enlightened and more prosperous, and the dangers which may still threaten the British Empire in India are not those which struck the mind of Mr. Greville in 1858. He himself, however, soon changed his opinion. See entry of the 12th March, _infra._]
_January 16th._--I went to The Grange on Tuesday and returned yesterday morning, when I was met by the news of an attempted assassination of the Emperor Napoleon, whose escape seems to have been providential.
It is since I last wrote anything here that we have received the news from India of Wyndham's defeat at Cawnpore, and of Sir Colin's subsequent victory, but we are not yet informed of the details so as to be able to pass a judgement on these events, and upon Wyndham's conduct. It may be doubted, however, whether the small defeat in the one case is not more prejudicial than the considerable victory in the other is advantageous; and the inference to be derived from the whole is to my mind of a gloomy character, for I think unless we can manage to pour into India an unceasing stream of fresh troops for an indefinite period, we shall succumb in the contest by the mere weight of numbers, and the question is, whether we shall be able to do this, which seems to me exceedingly doubtful. The Government appear never to have been sufficiently alive to the danger and the difficulties of this warfare, and have contented themselves with going on leisurely and lazily, preparing reinforcements to be sent out from time to time, but have never thought it incumbent on them to make the extraordinary efforts that the case imperatively demands.
[Sidenote: LORD JOHN RUSSELL IN OPPOSITION.]
When Parliament meets I shall be surprised if there is not before long a great storm in both Houses, and if Palmerston means to rest upon his popularity, and to endeavour to conjure it by his habitual offhand manner and assurances that they have done all they could, expecting that such assurances will be accepted as a matter of course, I think he will be greatly mistaken. In spite of all that has been said to John Russell, and his not unfriendly disposition during the short autumnal session, his patience and prudence are evidently well-nigh exhausted, and we may soon expect to see him in vehement opposition. He writes to his brother that 'he is appalled at the part he may be obliged to take in the coming session,' and he seems to be under the influence of a fresh feeling of antipathy to Palmerston. It is not unlikely that he thinks it not worth his while to wait for the chance of Palmerston's being withdrawn from the field, and that he may as well gratify his inclination by going into Opposition, and it is likely enough that he fancies he has more influence in the House of Commons and the country than he really possesses, and may collect a party of his own, instead of being grudgingly accepted by the present Government as a matter of necessity, rather than one of choice. If this is his view, I believe he is egregiously mistaken. Lowe, whom I met at The Grange, and who knows something of both Parliamentary and public opinion, told me that John Russell would find no support in the House of Commons where his influence was extinct, and that so far from forming a party of his own, he did not believe if Palmerston were to die to-morrow, and Lord John take his place at the head of the Government, that the Government itself would stand.