Dr. Hay replied with much and able subtlety; owned that when he was for putting off the question last year he had meant to reject it; his party had said that it was not proper for that House to declare on law; he himself had said those warrants were illegal, unless great urgency in their favour.[52] He agreed that, by the common law of the land, those warrants were illegal: nay, he thought the question ought to be settled by Parliament, not by a resolution of one House only. Sir William had omitted the words _seditious_ and _treasonable_, though adopted last year. The House might do what it pleased, but ought it to do so? Why not make the case general to all cases? Then this resolution, he heard, was to be followed by another on breach of privilege; but was every injury to a member a breach of privilege? Was the House to be an universal judicatory for offences? But the House had already declared that it has no privilege in the case of seditious and treasonable libels--a question of law is safe in courts of law; but Houses of Commons, not being permanent, may vary their resolutions. One House--both Houses cannot declare laws, though they, with the King, may enact laws. The question had either been adjudged, or was pending: both were true. The Court of Common Pleas had decided and given damages; then he named the Chief Justice Pratt, taking notice of the strong expression of _an iron rod_, used by that magistrate on the occasion. All juries say General Warrants are illegal; but at present the question had been hung up by the bill of exceptions, which bills are in the nature of appeals--an argument why the House should not, at that time, make a declaration. If there had been delay, why was not the offender called on? He had heard that the delay arose from the prosecutors. If anything was done wrong in the Courts below, the House alone could redress it. He then, as a correction to the proposed question, moved the following strange and scarce intelligible sentence (to load the motion ridiculously, and with intention to reject afterwards the question so amended), “That in the particular case of libels, it is proper and necessary to fix, by a vote of this House only, what ought to be deemed the law in respect of General Warrants; and for that purpose, at the time when the determination of the legality of such warrants, in the instance of a most seditious and treasonable libel, is actually depending before the courts of law; for this House do declare that a General Warrant for apprehending the authors, printers, or publishers of a libel, together with their papers, is not warranted by law, and is a high violation of the liberty of the subject.”