_Frognal, November 14th._--The news of the capture of Delhi and the relief of Lucknow excited a transport of delight and triumph, and everybody jumped to the conclusion that the Indian contest was virtually at an end. Granville told me he thought there would be no more fighting, and that the work was done. I was not so sanguine, and though I thought the result of the contest was now secure, I thought we should still have a great deal on our hands and much more fighting to hear of before the curtain could drop. But I was not prepared to hear the dismal news which arrived to-day, and which has so cruelly damped the public joy and exultation. It appears that Havelock is in great danger and the long suffering garrison of Lucknow not yet out of their peril, for the victory of Havelock had not been complete, the natives were gathering round the small British force in vast numbers, and unless considerable reinforcements could be speedily brought up, the condition of the British, both military and civilians, of men, women, and children, would soon again be one of excessive danger.
_The Grove, November 15th._--I talked with Clarendon about the Government letter to the Bank[1] and the state of financial affairs. It is evident that Clarendon knows very little about these questions, and takes very little part in them, but he told me one curious fact. A letter which appeared about a week ago, addressed by the Emperor of the French to his Finance Minister, made a great sensation here. In it the Emperor deprecated all empirical measures for the purpose of meeting the prevailing difficulties, financial and commercial, at Paris. About a week before this Clarendon received a letter from Cowley, who said that he had been conversing with the Emperor and with Walewski on these matters, and Walewski had begged him (by the desire of the Emperor) to write to Clarendon and request the advice of the English Government as to the course he should adopt. Clarendon said that George Lewis was out of town, but as there could be no delay, he sent his private secretary to the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, and requested their advice and opinion. They said it was so important they would go down to the Foreign Office, which they did, when they told Clarendon that their advice was that the Emperor should insist on the Bank of France following as nearly as possible the example of the Bank of England, to keep their rates of discount high, and to avoid all rash experiments of any kind. He wrote to Cowley accordingly, who communicated the answer, and judging from the dates it would appear that the Emperor's letter was the consequence of the advice so tendered. But Clarendon seemed to think that the appearance of the Government letter was rather awkward, and would appear to the French Government very inconsistent with our communication to them. However, it will probably be easy to afford satisfactory explanations on this head. The measure itself here has apparently had the desired success, and they hope the panic and distress will gradually subside, without any more mischief happening. Lewis thinks that the best mode of dealing with Peel's Act will be to retain it, but to give a power to the Queen in Council to relax it in the same manner as has been now twice done by the interposition of Government, whenever an urgent necessity should arise, and I suppose this is the course that will be adopted, though not without a great deal of discussion and diversity of opinion. I have hitherto said nothing about the very curious and important state of affairs in America and in this country, because I am too ignorant of financial questions to talk about them, and I have not been apprised of any facts beyond what all the world knows that it was worth while to record, but this anecdote of the French Government and our own appears sufficiently curious to have a place in this book.