That Moles are blind and have no eyes, though a common opinion, is received with much variety; some affirming only they have no sight, as _Oppianus_, the Proverb _Talpa Cæcior_, and the word ÏÏαλαÏία, or _Talpitas_, which in _Hesychius_ is made the same with _Cæcitas_: some that they have eyes, but no sight, as the text of _Aristotle_ seems to imply; some neither eyes nor sight, as _Albertus_, _Pliny_, and the vulgar opinion; some both eyes and sight, as _Scaliger_, _Aldrovandus_, and some others. Of which opinions the last with some restriction, is most consonant unto truth: for that they have eyes in their head is manifest unto any, that wants them not in his own: and are discoverable, not only in old ones, but as we have observed in young and naked conceptions, taken out of the belly of the Dam. And he that exactly enquires into the cavity of their cranies, may perhaps discover some propagation of nerves communicated unto these parts. But that the humours together with their coats are also distinct (though _Galen_ seem to affirm it) transcendeth our discovery; for separating these little Orbs, and including them in magnifying Glasses, we discerned no more then _Aristotle_ mentions, Ïῶν á½Ïθαλμῶν μέλαινα, that is, a black humour, nor any more if they be broken. That therefore they have eyes we must of necessity affirm; but that they be comparatively incomplete we need not to deny: So _Galen_ affirms the parts of generation in women are imperfect, in respect of those of men, as the eyes of Moles in regard of other Animals; So _Aristotle_ terms them ÏηÏÎ¿Ï Î¼á½³Î½Î¿Ï Ï, which _Gaza_ translates _Oblæsos_, and _Scaliger_ by a word of imperfection _inchoatos_.
Now as that they have eyes is manifest unto sense, so that they have sight not incongruous unto reason; if we call not in question the providence of this provision, that is, to assign the Organs, and yet deny the Office, to grant them eyes and withhold all manner of vision. For as the inference is fair, affirmatively deduced from the action to the Organ, that they have eyes because they see; so is it also from the organ to the action, that they have eyes, therefore some sight designed, if we take the intention of Nature in every species, and except the casual impediments, or morbosities in individuals. But as their eyes are more imperfect then others, so do we conceive of their sight or act of vision, for they will run against things, and hudling forwards fall from high places. So that they are not blind, nor yet distinctly see; there is in them no Cecity, yet more then a Cecutiency; they have sight enough to discern the light, though not perhaps to distinguish of objects or colours; so are they not exactly blind, for light is one object of vision. And this (as _Scaliger_ observeth) might be as full a sight as Nature first intended, for living in darkness under the earth, they had no further need of eyes then to avoid the light; and to be sensible when ever they lost that darkness of earth, which was their natural confinement. And therefore however Translators do render the word of _Aristotle_ or _Galen_, that is, _imperfectos oblæsos_ or _inchoatos_, it is not much considerable; for their eyes are sufficiently begun to finish this action, and competently perfect for this imperfect Vision.