[82] Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p. 15, 16. s. 19-22.
[83] See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenes in his orations frequently insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared with those of the smaller Grecian states—and of the higher and more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See a striking passage in the speech De Coronâ, p. 245. s. 77; and Orat. De Republ. Ordinand. p. 176. s. 37.
Isokrates holds the same language touching the obligations of Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus. “No one will quarrel with Epidaurians and Phliasians, for looking only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we cannot preserve ourselves with honor, we ought to prefer a glorious death.” (Isokrates, Orat. vi. Archid. s. 106.)
The backward and narrow policy, which Isokrates here proclaims as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip’s power was yet nascent and unsettled.
The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awe-striking event—Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.[84]
In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favor of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi,—or even when embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander’s last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchestus.[85] He was already within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B. C., against the Phokians.