The main area suitable for tank operations having been fixed upon by the Tank Corps, the next requirement was to select a definite objective, the attack against which would draw the enemy’s reserves towards it and so relieve the pressure which was being exerted against the Fifth Army at Ypres. Two localities were considered, St. Quentin and Cambrai. The first was opposite the French area, the second opposite the British.
The suggestion put forward as regards the St. Quentin operation was abandoned on account of difficulties arising out of a British force operating in the French area; it must be remembered that at this time no real unity of command existed in France.
The Cambrai project consisted in a surprise raid, the duration of which would be about twenty-four hours. The whole operation may be summed up in three words, “Advance, Hit, Retire.” Its object was to destroy the enemy’s personnel and guns, to demoralise and disorganise his fighting troops and reserves, and not to capture ground or to hold trenches. It was further considered that such an operation would interrupt his _roulement_ of reserves and make the enemy think twice as to replacing fresh divisions by exhausted and demoralised units in those parts of his line which were not included in his battle front. Further, it would confuse him as to the decisive point of attack; for any day one of these raids might be followed by a strong offensive.
The actual area of operations selected was the re-entrant formed by the L’Escaut or St. Quentin Canal between the villages of Ribecourt, Crèvecœur, and Banteux. The going in this area was excellent; further, the area to be raided contained several fair-sized villages and important ground, and was well limited by the canal, which not only made a rapid reinforcing of the area in the bend difficult, but completely limited the tank objectives.
(i) To scour the country between Marcoing, Masnières, Crèvecœur, Le Bosquet, Banteux.
(ii) To form an offensive flank between Le Bosquet and Ribecourt.
(iii) To form an offensive flank against Banteux.
The attack was to be launched at dawn, the first line of tanks making straight for the enemy’s guns, which before, and as the tanks approached them, were to be bombed by our aeroplanes. The second and third lines of tanks were to follow, whilst our heavy guns commenced counter-battery work and the shelling of the villages and bridges along the canal. The essence of the entire operation was to be surprise coupled with rapidity of movement. The spirit of such an enterprise is audacity, which was to take the place of undisguised preparation.