To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.
Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and the means of maintaining them in condition--_i.e._, conditions of supply--are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant, sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor. Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in 1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.
The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that amount always in the country through which we may have to operate would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous operations.
We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a large export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink very low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of our movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, we shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can be transmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supply columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore, condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operations which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on to develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitter disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.