This appeal raises the question of whether and under what circumstances a District Court may properly enter a 'consent' judgment in a civil antitrust suit without the consent of the Government and without trial of certain disputed issues.
On July 21, 1961, the Government filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The complaint charged the five appellee bakery companies with violating § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by conspiring:
'(a) To allocate among themselves the business of supplying bakery products (defined as bread and rolls) to the United States Naval installations in the Jacksonville area; and
'(b) To submit noncompetitive, collusive, and rigged bids and price quotations for supplying bakery products to United States Naval installations in the Jacksonville area.'
The Government sought relief, including an adjudication that the companies had violated the Act, an injunction against allocating business or fixing prices in the supplying of bakery products to United States naval installations in the Jacksonville area, and 'such further, general, and different relief as the nature of the case may require and the Court may deem appropriate in the premises.'
On May 8, 1962, after an extensive period of settlement negotiations, the bakery companies filed with the court a proposed form of judgment which would have enjoined the companies from conspiring to:
'(a) Submit noncompetitive, collusive or rigged bids, or quotations for supplying bakery products to United States Naval installations in the Jacksonville area, or '(b) Allocate, divide or rotate the business of supplying bakery products to United States Naval installations in the Jacksonville area.' (Emphasis added.)
The proposed judgment would also have required the companies to include sworn statements of noncollusion in each bid for bakery products submitted to any naval installations in the Jacksonville area for the following three years.
The District Court ordered the Government to show cause 'why the said proposed judgment * * * should not be entered.' The Government replied, objecting 'to confining the scope of the injunction to bids for supplying bread and rolls to United States Naval Installations in the Jacksonville area' and 'to limiting the requirement * * * that bids be accompanied by sworn statements of non-collusion, to a three year period.'
The bakery companies then filed an amended motion for entry of consent judgment, containing two significant changes in their original proposal. Its scope was broadened to include all bakery products, not only bread and rolls, and to include all sales to the United States, not only to its naval installations in the Jacksonville area. Subsequently, at the hearing on the order to show cause, the companies agreed to increase, from three to five years, the period during which they were to submit sworn statements of noncollusion.
The Government opposed entry of the amended proposed consent judgment on the ground that it still omitted two necessary items of relief:
'(1) a general injunction against conspiring to fix the price of bakery products to any third party other than the Government, and (2) an injunction against urging or suggesting to any seller of bakery products the quotation or charging of any price or other terms or conditions of sale of bakery products.' Despite these objections, the District Court entered the amended 'consent' judgment proposed by the companies. The judgment recited that it was entered 'without trial or adjudication of any of the issues of fact or law herein and before the taking of any testimony * * *.' In his opinion accompanying the entry of judgment, the district judge said:
'The demand of the plaintiff as to the inclusion of the two controversial provisions in its tendered judgment does not have a reasonable basis under the circumstances here present. * * * Based upon this court's knowledge of the facts involved in Case No. 11677-Crim-J and this record, the proposed judgment which the court is entering provides all the relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled after the entry of a decree pro confesso against each defendant and after a trial on the allegations of this complaint. * * * The mere fact that a court has found a defendant has committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to contempt proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged.'