The defendant did not remove from said premises at the expiration of six months and the statutory demand for delivery of possession was personally served on defendant. After the expiration of said period, he refused to vacate the premises, and thereupon the defendant here instituted and prosecuted summary proceedings in the Second District Court of the City of Newark, in which Court judgment for possession of the premises was rendered May 23, 1919, and the removal of plaintiffs, being the alleged act of trespass for which this suit is brought, was, by virtue of the order of removal, made by that Court upon said judgment.

There is no contention that there was any irregularity in the proceedings of that Court, if the Court has jurisdiction; but the plaintiff here insists that the provisions of the lease above quoted constituted a condition, or covenant, and not a limitation of the term, and that consequently the District Court did not have jurisdiction.

The New Jersey Law Journal Jan. 1922 — Part 28

The parties hereto have entered into a stipulation to submit this suit to the Court for judgment upon the complaint, answer and reply, which correctly sets forth the facts as above stated, and adds:

The New Jersey Law Journal Jan. 1922 — Part 28

"If the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, judgment is to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and there is to be an assessment of the damages by a jury drawn for that purpose, reserving however all questions of law as to the measure of damages; and, if the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant as if said cause had been tried and a verdict in favor of the defendant had been rendered"; both parties reserving the right to appeal from the judgment to be entered.

The New Jersey Law Journal Jan. 1922 — Part 28

It is admitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, if the said provision of the lease constituted limitation of McGann's terms, then the District Court had jurisdiction and the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit.

The jurisdiction of the District Court in such cases is confined in its application to the instant case, to "When any such person shall hold over and continue in possession ... after the expiration of his ... term," etc. Admittedly the decision of this case rests upon whether or not the sale of the premises and the notice given by the lessor and LaBrecque Company to the plaintiff ended the term of the McGann Company. If it did--if this was a limitation of the plaintiff's term,--the jurisdiction of the District Court was complete.