Moreover, if there must be interference for the sake of the country itself, to promote its growth in order and civilization, actual experience has shown that such interference can only come efficiently by one nation, and not by many. Untried theorists, or even practical men who are influenced by national jealousy and are untaught by the lessons of history, have a curious fondness for trying a system of joint interference or joint control. Americans forget, for instance, that we have actually tried this system and found it completely wanting, in the case of Samoa. We made an arrangement with England and Germany by which there was a joint protectorate over Samoa. The system worked wretchedly. It resulted badly for the natives; it was a fruitful source of bickering among the three Powers. Then we abandoned the system, each Power took its own sphere, and since then we have gotten along admirably; the only trouble in connection with Samoa which arose during my entire administration as President came because we were not able to grant the earnest request of the natives that we should take real and complete possession of our part of the islands and really regulate the government instead of leaving it so much in the hands of the native chiefs.
In the case of the Philippines, there were just two things that we could do which would have been worse than leaving them under Spanish rule. One of these would have been to turn the islands adrift to manage themselves. The second would have been to try to manage them by a joint arrangement of various Powers. Any such arrangement in the case of as rich and valuable islands as the Philippines would very possibly have led to war between the great Powers. It would have certainly led to jealousy, bickerings, and intrigue among them, would have held the islands back, would have prevented any development along the lines of progress and civilization, and would have insured an endless succession of devastating little civil wars.
When all that is necessary as regards a small State is to protect it from external aggression, then the great Powers can with advantage join to guarantee its integrity. When anything more is necessary to try to develop the people and civilization, to put down disorder, to stop civil war and secure justice, then a combination of Powers offers the worst possible way of securing the object sought to be achieved. Indeed, under such circumstances it is probably better for the State concerned to be under the control of a single Power, even though this Power has not high ideals, rather than under the control of three or four Powers which may possess high ideals but which are put into such an impossible situation that they are certain to be riven asunder by jealousy, distrust, and intrigue, and to do damage rather than good to the people whom they are supposed to protect.