[-22-] When this news was spread, none of the rest, even if he had strength still left, defended himself longer. Some imitated their leader; others, throwing aside their arms, allowed who pleased to slay them. To flee was impossible, however one might wish it. Every man and horse, therefore, was cut down without resistance, and the[3] ...
And the barbarians occupied all the strongholds save one, delay over which prevented them from either crossing the Rhine or invading Gaul. Yet they found themselves unable to reduce this particular fort because they did not understand the conduct of sieges and because the Romans employed numerous archers, who repeatedly repulsed them and from first to last destroyed a large proportion of the attacking party.
Later they learned that the Romans had posted a guard at the Rhine and that Tiberius was approaching with an imposing force of fighters. Therefore most of the barbarians retired from the fortress, and the detachment still left there withdrew some distance away, so as not to be damaged by sudden sallies of the men inside; and they kept watch of the roads, hoping to capture the garrison through scarcity of food supplies. The Romans within, so long as they had abundance of sustenance, remained where they were awaiting relief. But when no one came to their assistance and they were likewise a prey to hunger, they watched for a stormy night and issued forth--the soldiers were but fed, the unarmed many,--and
they passed the first and second guard of their adversaries, but when they reached the third they were detected; for on account of fatigue and fear, and the darkness and cold, the women and children kept calling to the men of fighting age to come back. They would all have perished or been captured, had not the barbarians been so busily occupied with seizing the plunder. This gave an opportunity for many of the most hardy to get some distance off, and the trumpeters with them by sounding the signal for a double quick march caused the enemy to think (for night was coming on and they could not be seen) that they had been sent from Asprenas. Therefore the foe ceased their pursuit, and Asprenas on learning what was taking place rendered them assistance in reality. Some of the captives were later ransomed by their relatives and returned, for this was permitted on condition that the ransoming party should be outside of Italy at the time.--But this was only afterward. [-23-] At the time, when Augustus heard of the disaster to Varus, he rent his clothing (as some assert) and mourned greatly over the lost soldiers as also over the fear inspired by the Germans and the Gauls. His grief was especially keen because he expected that they would march upon Italy and upon Rome itself. There were no citizens of military age worth mentioning that were left and the allied forces that were of any value had been ruined. Nevertheless he made preparations as well as he could in view of the circumstances: and when no one of the proper age for warfare showed a willingness to be enrolled, he instituted a drawing of lots and deprived of his property every fifth man to draw of those not yet thirty-five years old and every tenth man among those who were older, besides disenfranchising them. Finally, as very many paid no heed to him even then, he put some to death. He chose by lot as many as he could of those who had already finished their service and of the freedmen, and having enrolled them sent them at once in haste with Tiberius into Germany. And as there were in Rome a number of Gauls and Celtæ, sojourning there for various purposes, and some of them serving in the pretorian guard, he feared that they might commit some act of insurrection: therefore he sent such as were in his guard off to the islands and ordered the unarmed class to leave the city.