‘Even when conspiracies against his royal person have been so far carried by witchcraft and otherwise, that he is disabled from administering justice; and the tyrant being found deserving of that punishment, the king, from weakness of intellect, cannot, or will not, punish him, the killing of him, in such cases, is not against the law, properly speaking, for all laws have two meanings: the first is the textual signification, the other is the ‘quo animo,’—the person committing a crime has done it, and the law, as intended by those who made it, is to be explained according to the intent of its framers, and not always according to the literal sense.
‘Thus the philosopher brings forward the example of citizens who made a law for the defence of their city, that no one, under pain of death, should mount the ramparts, because their city was besieged; and they were afraid, should strangers mount the walls with the inhabitants, there might arise danger to them, from these strangers, at a proper opportunity, joining their enemies, or at least making them signs to show where they might the more easily attack the town.
‘It happened, that this town was attacked at several places,—when the strangers and pilgrims who were within it, observing the enemy were much superior to the inhabitants, armed themselves and mounted the walls at the weaker parts, when they repulsed the enemy, and saved the town. The philosopher then asks, Since these pilgrims have mounted the walls contrary to the express words of the law, they have infringed it, and should they not be punished? I say no; for although they have acted contrary to the literal text of the law, they have not disobeyed the spirit of it, which was the saving of the town,—for had they not mounted the walls in its defence, it must have been taken.
‘As to the laws which declare, that none ought to administer justice but the prince, nor do any deeds of arms without his licence,—I maintain, that these laws were made for the preservation of the king’s honour and person, and for the public good.
‘Should there exist a tyrant of great power and authority, who is continually practising, by witchcraft and other means, the death of the king, and to deprive him of his kingdom,—and should that king, from weakness of intellect or want of force, be unable to punish him, and should he permit him to go on in his wickedness,—I should disregard, in this case, the law that forbids me to bear arms without the king’s licence, or to take the authority into my own hands in a general sense only. What have I to do with the literal sense of it? Am I to leave my king in such peril? By no means. I am bound to defend my king, and put to death the tyrant; for should I, by thus acting, do contrary to the text of the law, I follow the spirit of it, and the object it was directed to, namely, the preservation of the honour and life of my king; and I should think myself more deserving of praise than if I had suffered the tyrant to live on in his wickedness. I ought therefore to be rewarded, and not punished, for having done a meritorious deed, tending to a good purpose, for which end all laws were made.