Following our decision in Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln et al. (June 2, 1919) 250 U.S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454, 63 L. Ed. 968, our mandate went down to the District Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, reciting our determination that its decree of September 23, 1915, should be modified as indicated in the opinion, and as so modified should be affirmed with costs, and proceeding as follows:

'You, therefore, are hereby commanded that such execution and proceedings be had in said cause as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding.'

Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Company/Opinion of the Court

Upon the filing of this mandate, the District Court, on January 6, 1920, entered an order modifying its decree of September 23, 1915, as particularly required, and, at the same time, made an order retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of requiring the company to make refund and restitution to consumers of gas for all amounts collected over and above the legal rate pending the litigation, with interest, in accordance with the terms of a bond that the company had filed in the cause in order to obtain a supersedeas, with a continuance of injunction, pending its appeal from the decree of September 23, 1915. An appeal from the order retaining jurisdiction, taken by the company to this court, was dismissed because the order lacked finality. 253 U.S. 477, 40 Sup. Ct. 585, 65 L. Ed. 1022. The mandate upon the dismissal again commanded the District Court:

Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Company/Opinion of the Court

'That such proceedings be had in said cause, as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding.'

Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Company/Opinion of the Court

This having gone down, the court appointed a master, with direction to examine the books and accounts of the company and prepare an account of the amounts paid by consumers in excess of the ordinance rates during the pendency of any restraining order or injunction in the cause, with other provisions not necessary to be mentioned.

The company applied to this court, obtained leave for the purpose, and filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to command the judge of the District Court to nullify and revoke the above-mentioned orders and refrain from assuming jurisdiction over the cause as aforesaid. An order to show cause was is sued, proper return thereto made by the judge, and the matter has been argued.